THE EURASIAN UNION | ALEXANDER DUGIN

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Alexander Dugin (b. 1962) is one of the best-known writers and political commentators in post-Soviet Russia. During the 1980s, he was a principal member of the underground traditionalist movement in the Soviet Union, for which he was arrested by the KGB and expelled from his studies at the Moscow Aviation Institute in 1983. He continued to support his private studies in traditionalist philosophy by working as a street sweeper. He later became a journalist and made his earliest foray into politics by joining Pamyat, the first nationalist party to emerge during the twilight years of the USSR. In 2001, Dugin founded the Eurasia Movement, which he has continued to lead up to the present day. For more than a decade, he has also been an advisor to Vladimir Putin and others in the Kremlin on geopolitical matters, being a vocal advocate of a return of Russian power to the global stage, to act as a counterweight to American domination.

THE EURASIAN UNION

Putin’s programmatic text, “The Eurasian Union: A Path to Success and Prosperity,” published in the newspaper Izvestia on October 3, 2011, was extremely significant. In this text, Putin declared a landmark in the integration of the post-Soviet space, first on an economic level, and then on a political one (about which, it is true, he only hints).Beyond economic integration, Putin described a higher — geopolitical and political — aim: the future creation on the space of Northern Eurasia of a new, supranational organization, built on civilizational commonality. As the European Union, uniting countries and societies related to European civilization, began with the “European Coal and Steel Community” to gradually develop into a new supra-governmental organization, so too would the Eurasian Union take on a supranational character, declared by Putin to be a long-term, historic goal.The idea of a Eurasian Union was worked out in two countries simultaneously in the early 1990s: in Kazakhstan by President N. A. Nazarbayev1 and in Russia by the Eurasian Movement.2 In Moscow in 1994, Nazarbayev voiced the idea of this project of the political integration of the post-Soviet space, and even proposed the development of a constitution for a Eurasian Union similar to that of the European Union. And, for its part, the idea of a Eurasian Union was actively elaborated by the Eurasian Movement in Russia, continuing in the line of the first Russian Eurasianists, who had laid the foundations for this political philosophy. The creation of a Eurasian Union became the principal historic, political, and ideological aim of the Russian Eurasianists, as this project embodied all the primary values, ideals, and horizons of Eurasianism as a complete political philosophy.

Thus Putin, turning his attention to the Eurasian Union, emphasized a political idea imbued with deep political and geopolitical significance. The Eurasian Union, as the concrete embodiment of the Eurasian project, contains three levels at once: the planetary, the regional, and the domestic.

On a planetary scale, we are talking about the establishment, in the place of a unipolar or “nonpolar” (global) world, of a multipolar model, where only a powerful, integrated regional organization can be a whole (exceeding even the largest states by its scale and economic, military-strategic, and energy potential).

On a regional scale, we are talking about the creation of an integrated organization capable of being a pole of a multipolar world. In the West, the European Union can act as such a project of integration. For Russia, this means the integration of the post-Soviet space into a single strategic bloc.

Domestically, Eurasianism means the assertion of strategic centralism, rejecting even the suggestion of the presence of prototypes of national statehood in the subjects of the Federation. It also implies a broad program for strengthening the cultural, linguistic, and social identities of those ethnoses that comprise Russia’s traditional composition.

Putin repeatedly spoke of multipolarity in his assessments of the international situation. Putin started to speak about the necessity of distinguishing the “nation” (a political formation) from the “ethnos” in domestic policy in the spring of 2011, which means that the Eurasian model was adopted at this time.3

Thus, Eurasianism can be taken as Putin’s general strategy for the future, and the unambiguous conclusion follows from this that the strategy of Russia’s return to its geopolitical, continental function as the Heartland will be clarified, consolidated, and carried out.

Footnotes

1 Alexander Dugin, Nursultan Nazarbayev’s Eurasian Mission (Moscow: Eurasia Publishing, 2004).

2 The Eurasian Mission: Policy Papers of the International Eurasian Movement (Moscow, 2005). [English edition: Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism (London: Arktos, 2014). The Eurasian Movement is Alexander Dugin’s own organization.—Ed.].

3 Alexander Dugin, Ethnosociology (Moscow: Academic Project, 2011).

The above text is an excerpt from Alexander Dugin’s Last War of the World-Island (Arktos, 2015). If you liked this selection, be sure to check out the whole book.

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THE EURASIAN PLATFORM | ALEXANDER DUGIN

In Ancient belief included in life, life-in faith, both merged together, in a coherent system of “domestic confession”; the organic part of this “household of confession” was and state ideology, which, like everything in Russian life, was inseparable from the religious worldview.

N. N. Troubetzkoy

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1. Geopolitics as the operating system

As a geopolitical reality reflected in the political life of modern Russia? What are the ways of development of Eurasian trends in the near future? When looking at these problems it is necessary to constantly keep in mind that the geopolitical trends do not always strictly coincide with specific political forces or individual figures. They can be distributed and work through completely unexpected factors and different personalities in various sectors the political palette.

Geopolitics and its laws affects political life not straight – party, a lobby or a complete political doctrine, but indirectly, as background, as context, as a set objective (external and internal) factors.

The basic programming language largely determines the structure of the programs written on it and use it. Geopolitics and there is such a basic language operating system derivatives of which are specific political doctrines and positions.

Very often the participants of the political process tend to attribute the impact of this background, underlying the geopolitical system of conventional historical chance, coincidence or Unpredictable turn of events. Really business, geopolitical logic has its complete structure, its own laws. Therefore, for the geopolitics of natural and self-evident it seems the fact that “just politics” seems to be the case, “surprise” or rock.

But if the basis of computer language binary code is 1 – 0, the geopolitical the system operates with a different couple: Eurasianism – Atlanticism, land – sea, continent island.

So how does a basic pair of “Eurasian impulse – Atlanticist impulse” the picture of political life that we received after the December elections and the resignation of Boris Yeltsin?

2. The Eurasian momentum

Eurasian impulse acts in modern Russia also objectively and consistently as he did always, throughout Russian history, at different phases to put it differently. Moreover, in the unity of geopolitical the Eurasian vector is axial reality, uniting between such distant phenomena as Kievan Rus, Muscovy, Romanov Russia or the Soviet Union. On the face of the difference of worldviews socio-political models, cultural and national context. And Eurasian beginning clearly distinguishable everywhere under external forms, in which the Russians realize themselves historically. It is the geopolitics, Eurasianism is the universal language of our national identity, to which reduced other forms of our consciousness and expression. Though often this is realized either very dimly or not at all understood.

The Eurasian momentum is the Unit of our system, our the positive pole of historical existence, our Truth and our Light in contrast to the Atlanticist Zero, the pole of falsehood and Nenashev darkness.

Characteristically, it looks exactly like the picture, but with the opposite the estimated sign, draw and the most consistent and insightful strategists West, geopolitics-Atlanticists. Either / or. We did not devise these rules. in them were embodied some unknown for the ordinary small mind mystery historical predetermination.

This is a basic law of geopolitics, whether we like it or not.

3. Eurasia as the common denominator

In Russia today there is no single party or force that can no end to realize its Eurasian mission to declare himself as a clear leader of Eurasianism. But at the same time all over the political variety parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties and movements many deliberately or semi-conscious appeal to the Eurasian idea, often, however, featuring her thesis “state,” “patriotism,” “dominant” etc. The reference to geopolitics and the Eurasian idea in the official documents The Communist party and in the lyrics of Gennady Zyuganov. However, to appeal to the same realities characteristic of Vladimir Putin, the newly created blockThe “unity”. The thesis of the strategic triangle Moscow-Delhi-Beijing (voiced once Primakov) and the thesis of the Yeltsin-Putin about the “multipolar world” is nothing but a direct expression of the Eurasian idea on the strategic level.

Elements (sometimes conflicting) of Eurasianism have OVR Primakov-Luzhkov but there is also the liberal democratic party Vladimir Zhirinovsky. At the time, to Eurasianism treated and other as openly Pro-government (Popov, Stankevich, Lobov, Skokov, etc.) and extreme opposition forces (FNS, NPSR etc.).

The Eurasian momentum in the most General sense is expressed as awareness of continuity modern Russia to the earlier stages of Russian history, confidence in the existence in Russia of its special cultural and civilizational path, and in an effort to expand and strengthen the strategic area of our continental presence.

The factors pushing different politicians to Eurasianism, not reduced only to their subjective preferences, to their national sympathies, to arbitrary patriotism. To that objectively fail internal external factors. The inner – psychology of the people, formed as a Eurasian community with all the consequences and instinctive sympathetic sovereign line in politics, in whatever form it is manifested.

From the outside constantly doing the opposite of the hostile geopolitical pulses due to political, ideological, economic and strategic pressure Atlanticist camp that makes responsible statesmen (and ordinary people, really faced with the West) are reluctant to take a critical in respect of his position.

The West is committed to its geopolitical Atlanticist logic, its pole encoded geopolitical operaitonal system, which perfectly understands and from which he never retreats. Thus, its permanent unidirectional and pressure it will force the Russian leadership, before or late beginners to tire of such a dictatorship, to take the opposite geopolitical position. And this is Eurasianism, “a multipolar world” etc.

Whatever party and clan interests may be guided by Russian politicians of the new century, the overall center of gravity will remain for them is a Eurasian axisthat coincides with our national the courtlboy that embodies continuity, connection of times, land and deep psychological archetypes.

Any responsible Russian politician, loyal to his country, or “already Eurasian” or “not yet realized Eurasian”.

4. Public consensus on the geopolitical based

In normal case, the Russian state needs to be totally based on the Eurasian platform, and adherence to this geopolitical reality may not, under any circumstances, be called into question to become a subject of discussion. All parties and movements, no matter what program they would have put forward, just required to be Eurasianlike as equally Atlanticist are allparty and movements in the countries of the modern West and especially the USA. Atlanticism and Republicans and Democrats differ only in the definition of methods for achievements common to both, the recognized goal of world domination USA (wider, Western civilization, civilization of the Sea) have all ostalnymi lands and peoples of the earth, in the first place, over Eurasia.

Similarly (but, of course, with the opposite sign, placing at the forefront Russia, Watson, the Eurasian civilization) would have to do and all party of Russia, in agreement with each other to achieve a common Eurasian goal, but offering different methods of achieving it.

However, today Russia is experiencing the complicated process of changing identity paradigms. The Soviet modelin which the Eurasian impulse expressed in the last century of Russian history, changes on some other, not yet end formulated, developed, informed device. And while it is unclear what final form will the new national-state the organization of our political and historical existence.

Injuries of the collapse of the Soviet structure gave rise to a transitional, but very dangerous the phenomenon of national self-denial, defeatism, and the readiness to abandon our identity. This is especially scary manifested in the first years of reforms, when the absurd, from the point of view of geopolitics, “Russian atlantism”, “Russophobia” and “Pro-Americanism” became almost the normal state system and “political correctness”. This “Westernizing” eyes crashing all the reformist forces that want to remain in politics, Willy-nilly, are now forced to turn – at least outwardly – to the “Patriotic” the rhetoric, albeit to surrogate and fake, but the “Eurasianism”. But all the self-destructive inertia of the transition period is stillbig and so the final reduction of the whole of political life in the framework of the Eurasian the paradigm of to be.

In such a transitional situation (and especially given the departure from the political arena Boris Yeltsin, who symbolically represented the least successful, katastroficheski entirely destructive destructive period of the reformation) on the agenda may be the question of the creation of a special EURASIAN PLATFORM which would combine in itself the representatives of different parliamentary and non-parliamentary political and social structures.

The EURASIAN PLATFORM could become a kind of area consent all responsible political forces in our society, the center of Waimakariri the most serious aspects of political activity. Under the auspices of this The EURASIAN PLATFORM could unite in the name of statehood and right and left, the socialists and the marketeers who agree with the main postulate:any political differences should not lead the destabilization of the Russian State, to undermine its security to weaken our strategic and civilizational sovereignty, to violate social stability in society.

The formation of the EURASIAN PLATFORM would first marginalize, then to isolate and later, to finally overcome those political segments Russian society, which is completely free from loyalty to our people, our state, being ready to sacrifice personal, party or clan interests, the fundamental values of Russia as an independent the subject of history.

Before the presidential election EURASIAN PLATFORM could be the instance to prevent the political struggle in the destructive, anti-state action. For example, due to the fact that the elections are held in conditions of war, could be installed on a moratorium on criticism of government and the power departments with abstract pacifist, a ban on “propaganda of defeatism”.

Leaders, social projects, economic programs, political slogans and the charters are free to compete in parliamentary and other forms. But no serious political figure or party, claiming the responsibility should not go beyond such a EURASIAN PLATFORM.

The EURASIAN PLATFORM, it would be logical to join the “Unity”, the Communist party, OVR, LDPR, the agrarians, groups “Regions of Russia”, many independent the deputies and the leaders of SPS and Yabloko, which would confirm the solidarity with the fate of the Motherland, formally abandoning the erstwhile “Atlanticist illusions or delusions.”

Analytical instrument of the EURASIAN PLATFORM might be “The center for Geopolitical Expertise”, working simultaneously with the Administration President, Russian Government, Federation Council and State Duma. This centre could perform the functions of objective evaluation of large-scale economic, social and political projects and initiatives based on global geopoliticheskikh interests of the Russian State, regardless of rank and on the face tracking, does a particular plan or project harm geopolitics of the country.

5. The Birth Of The National Idea

In the normal State the need for the EURASIAN PLATFORM will disappear itself, since Civilizational loyalty to and the geopolitical identity of Russia will also be implied. But at this stage the need in this form of social cohesion and consolidation is clearly on the face, especially many historical barriers to implementing such initiatives disappeared, and today, more than ever, this structure could serve as for the benefit of society.

In addition, the EURASIAN platform as it is impossible to accurately correspond to the underlying political reality required to develop a new model Russian national Idea, to bring to a common denominator of the projects and plans that offer all the political forces, sincerely devoted to Russia, but not as “simple State”, “one..”, but as special civilization, unique strategic, cultural, and spiritual the continent.

The national Idea can not be born in any one movement, can not to be formulated by a single author or group of authors. It is from the living womb of national history. But certain public institutions are quite capable to help her be born, free and sovereign.

EURASIAN platform would be the perfect tool to achieve this purpose.

MAIN PRINCIPLES OF EURASIST POLICY | ALEXANDER DUGIN

 1. Three patterns (Soviet, pro-Western, Eurasist)

In modern Russia there exist three basic, reciprocally conflicting patterns of state strategy both in the sphere of foreign policy, and in the field of domestic policy. These three patterns form the modern system of political co-ordinates in which any political decision of the Russian government, any international step, any serious social, economic or juridical problem is decomposed.
The first pattern represents the inertial cliché of the Soviet (mainly later Soviet) period. It has somehow taken roots in the psychology of some Russian managing systems, often unconsciously, pushing them into adopting such or such decision on the basis of the precedents. This pattern is supported with the “relevant” argument: «It worked earlier, it will work also now». It concerns not only those political leaders who consciously exploit the nostalgic complex of the Russian citizens. The Soviet reference pattern is much wider and deeper than the structures of the KPFR [Communist Party of the Russian Federation], which now stands at the rim of  executive power, far from the decisional centres. Everywhere politicians and officials, formally not identifying themselves in any way with communism, are guided by it. It is an effect of education, life experience, formation. In order to understand the substance of the undergoing processes in Russian politics, it is necessary to admit this “unconscious sovietism”. The second pattern is the liberal-democrat, pro-American one. It started taking shape with the beginning of “perestroyka” and became some kind of dominant ideology in the first half of the 1990s. As a rule, the so-called liberal-reformers and the political forces close to them identify themselves with it. This pattern is based on choosing as system of reading of the American socio-political device, copying it on the Russian ground and following US national interests in international issues. Such pattern has the advantage to allow to lean on the quite real “foreign present”, as against the virtual “domestic past” around which the first pattern gravitates. The argument here too is rather simple: «It works for them, it will work for us too». Here it is important to stress that we are not simply talking about “foreign experience”, but about the orientation towards the US, as to the flagship of the successful Western capitalist world.

These two patterns (plus their manifold variations) are diffusely represented in Russian politics. Since the end of the 1980s all basic world-view conflicts, discussions and political fights takes place between the bearers of these two views.

The third pattern is much less known. It can be defined as “eurasist”. We are dealing here with much more complex operations, than simply copying the Soviet or American experience. This pattern refers both to the domestic past and to the foreign present in terms of differentiation: it derives something from our political history, something from the reality of modern societies. The eurasist pattern recognises that Russia (as a State, as a people, as a culture) is an autonomous civilisation value, that she should save its uniqueness, independence and power in that that became, having put at the service of this purpose any doctrine, system, mechanism and political technique which can to this encourage. Eurasism, in this way, is an original “patriotic pragmatism”, free from any dogmatics – be it Soviet or liberal. But at the same time, the wideness and flexibility of the eurasist approach do not prevent  this theory from being conceptually systematic, possessing all the marks of an organic, consequent, internally consistent world-view.

As the two former orthodox patterns show their unfitness, eurasism becomes more and more popular. The Soviet pattern operates with obsolete political, economic and social realities, it exploits nostalgia and inertness, it lacks a sober analysis of the new international situation and the real development of world economic trends. The pro-American liberal pattern, in turn, can not be realised in Russia by definition, being an organic part of another civilisation, alien to Russia. This is well understood in the West too, where nobody disguises their preference to see not a prospering and safe Russia, but, on the contrary, a weakened Russia, submerged in the abyss of chaos and corruption.

Therefore today the eurasist pattern becomes most urgent, most demanded by the society.

So we must take a closer look at it.

2. Eurasism and Russian foreign policy

Let us formulate the basic political principles of modern Russian eurasism.

We shall start from foreign policies.

As in every political field, also in foreign policy eurasism proposes to follow the third path – neither sovietism, nor americanism. It means that Russian foreign policies should not directly reconstruct the diplomatic profile of the Soviet period (rigid opposition to the West, recovering a strategic partnership with “rogue countries” – North Korea, Iraq, Cuba etc.) while at the same time it must not blindly follow the American advisors. Eurasism offers its own foreign policy doctrine. Its essence can be summarised as follows.

Contemporary Russia can be saved as an autonomous and independent political reality, as a valuable subject of international policy, only in the conditions of a multipolar world. Consenting to the unipolar American-centred world  is impossible for Russia, since in such world she could be but one of the objects of globalisation,  inevitably losing her independence and originality. The opposition to unipolar globalisation, the assertion of the multipolar pattern is the major imperative of contemporary Russian foreign policies. This condition must not be put into doubt by any political forces: and from this follows that the propagandists of American-centred globalisation inside Russia must be (at least morally) delegitimized. The construction of the multipolar world (vital for Russia) is feasible only through a system of strategic alliances. Russia alone cannot cope with this problem, not disposing of sufficient resources for complete autarchy. Therefore her success in many respects depends on the adequacy and activity of her foreign policy.

In the modern world there are some geopolitical subjects which, due historical and civilisation reasons, also are vitally interested in multipolarity. In the situation now taking shape these subjects represent Russia’s natural partners.

They are divided in some categories.

The first category: powerful regional formations (countries or group of countries), whose relations with Russia can be conveniently expressed by the term “complementary”. It means that these countries own something vital for Russia, while Russia owns something extremely indispensable for them. As a result, such strategic exchange of potentials strengthens both geopolitical subjects. To this category (symmetrically complementary) belong the European Union, Japan, Iran, India. All these geopolitical realities can quite reasonably claim to a role of  autonomous subjects in conditions of multipolarity, while American-centrism deprives them of this possibility, reducing them to mere objects. As the new Russia cannot be presented as an ideological enemy (that which ensured the US their major argument for drawing Europe and Japan into their orbit, and confounded the USSR into being pulled together with Islamic Iran in the “cold war” period), the imperative of complete subordination of these countries to American geopolitics is practically no more substantiated with anything (except for historical inertia). Hence, the contradictions between the US and the powers reciprocally complementary to Russia will be continuously aggravated.

If Russia will prove to be active and will substantiate with her potential the multipolar trend, finding for each of these geopolitical formations the right arguments and differentiated conditions for strategic alliance, the club of the supporters of multipolarity can become mighty  and influential enough to efficiently achieve the realisation of its own project of  future world system.

To each of these  powers Russia has what to offer – resources, strategic potential of weapons, political weight. In exchange Russia will receive, on the one hand, economic and technological sponsorship on behalf of the European Union and Japan, on the other hand – political-strategic partnership in the South on behalf of Iran and India.

Eurasism conceptualises such foreign-policy course and substantiates it by the scientific methodology of geopolitics.

The second category: geopolitical formations being interested in multipolarity, but not being symmetrically complementary to Russia. These are China, Pakistan, the Arab countries. The traditional policies of these geopolitical subjects have an intermediate character, but strategic partnership with Russia is not their major priority. Moreover, the eurasist alliance of Russia with the countries of the first category strengthens the traditional rivals of the countries of the second category at the regional level. For example, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have serious contradictions with Iran, as China with Japan and India. On a broader scale, the relations of Russia with China represent a special case, complicated by demographic problems, by the heightened interest of China to the scarcely populated territories of Siberia, and also the by absence at China of a serious technological and financial potential able to positively solve the major problem for Russia of technological assimilation of Siberia.

All the countries of the second category are delivered before necessity to manoeuvre between America-centred unipolarity (which does not promise anything good for them) and eurasism.

With regard to the countries of this category Russia must act with the utmost caution – not including them in the eurasist project, but at the same time aiming at neutralising as much as possible the negative potential of their reaction and actively countering their active inclusion in the process of unipolar globalisation (for which there are enough reasons).

The third category represents the countries of the Third World which do not possess enough geopolitical potential to claim even to the status of limited subjects. Concerning these countries Russia should follow differentiated policies, contributing to their geopolitical integration in zones of “common prosperity”, under the control of the mighty partners of Russia within the Eurasian bloc. This means that in the Pacific zone it is convenient for Russia to favour the strengthening of the Japanese presence. In Asia it is necessary to encourage the geopolitical ambitions of India and Iran. It is also necessary to contribute to expanding the European Union influence in the Arab world and Africa as a whole. The same states which are included into a traditional orbit of Russian influence must naturally remain there or be brought back into it. To this effect the policy of integration of the countries of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] to the Eurasian Union is directed.

The fourth category: the US and the countries of the American continent laying under US control. The international eurasist policies of Russia must be oriented to show by any means the US the inconsistency of the unipolar world, the conflicting character and irresponsibility of all process of American-centred globalisation. Rigidly and actively (using to this purpose, first of all, the instrument of the Eurasian alliance) opposing such globalisation, Russia should on the contrary support the isolationist tendency in the US, saluting with favour the limitation of US geopolitical interests to the American continent. The US, as the strongest regional power, whose circle of strategic interest is disposed between the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean, can  even be a strategic partner for an eurasist Russia. Moreover, such America will be extremely desirable for Russia, as she will limit Europe, the Pacific region, and also the Islamic world and China, in case their aspiration were to follow a path of unipolar globalisation on the basis of their own geopolitical system. And if unipolar globalisation will keep being staged, it is Russia’s interest to back the anti-American mood in Southern and Central America, using, however, a much more flexible and wider world-view and geopolitical device than Marxism. In the same channel lays the policy of priority work with anti-American political circles in Canada and Mexico. Possibly also using in this direction the lobbyist activity of the Eurasian diasporas in the US.

3. Eurasism and domestic policy

Eurasism in domestic policy means following some major directions.

The integration of CIS countries into a united Eurasian Union is the major strategic imperative of eurasism. The minimal strategic volume indispensable for starting a serious international activity to the creation of a multipolar world is not the Russian Federation, but the CIS taken as a single strategic reality, fastened by a single will and a common civilisation purpose.

The political system of the Eurasian Union in the most logical way is founded on the “democracy of participation” (the “demotia” of the classical eurasists), the accent being not on the quantitative, but on the qualitative aspect of representation. The representative authority should mirror the qualitative structure of the Eurasian society, instead of the average quantitative statistical indicators based on the efficiency of pre-election shows. Special attention should be given to the representation of ethnoses and religious confessions.  The “democracy of participation” must be organically integrated with a definite fraction of individual responsibility as much as possible expressed in strategic areas. The Supreme Leader of the Eurasian Union must concentrate the common will to the achievement of power and prosperity of the state.

The principle of the social imperative should be combined with the principle of personal freedom in a proportion essentially differing as much from liberal-democratic recipes, as from the impersonal collectivism of the Marxists. Eurasism supposes here the preservation of a definite balance, with a significant role of the public factor.

In general, the active development of the social principle is a constant feature of the Eurasian history. It is shown in our psychology, ethics, religion. But as against the Marxist patterns the social principle should be affirmed as something qualitative, differentiated, linked with the concrete national, psychological, cultural and religious setting. The social principle must not suffocate, but strengthen the private principle, giving it a qualitative background. The qualitative understanding of the social factor allows precisely to define the golden mean between the hyper-individualism of bourgeois West and the hyper-collectivism of socialist East.

In the administrative system eurasism insists on the model of  “eurasist federalism”. This supposes choosing as the basic category for building the Federation not the territories, but the ethnoses. Having separated the principle of ethno-cultural autonomy from the territorial principle, eurasist federalism will forever liquidate the same reasons for separatism. So as a compensation the peoples of the Eurasian Union receive the possibility of maximal development of ethnic, religious and even, in some definite issues, juridical independence. The undoubted strategic unity in eurasist federalism is accompanied by ethnic plurality, by the emphasis on the juridical element of the “rights of the peoples”.

The strategic control of the space of the Eurasian Union is ensured by the unity of management and federal strategic districts, in whose composition various formations can enter – from ethno-cultural to territorial. The immediate differentiation of territories into several levels will add flexibility, adaptability and plurality to the system of administrative management in combination with rigid centralism in the strategic sphere.

The Eurasian society should be founded on the principle of a revived moral possessing both common features and concrete forms linked to the specificity of the ethno-confessional context. The principles of naturalness, purity, restraint, respect for the rules, liability, healthy life, righteousness and truthfulness are common to all traditional faiths of Eurasia. These undeniable moral values must be given the status of state norms. Scandalous social vices, impudent and public violation of moral foundations should be ruthlessly rooted out.

The armed forces of Eurasia and the power ministries and offices must be considered as the strategic skeleton of the civilisation. The social role of the militaries should increase, it is necessary to restore their prestige and public respect.

On the demographic plan is indispensable to achieve the “proliferation of the Eurasian population”, morally, materially and psychologically encouraging having many children, making of it the Eurasian social standard.

In the field of education it is necessary to strengthen the moral and scientific education of youth in the spirit of faithfulness to historical roots, loyalty to the eurasist idea, liability, virility, creative activity.

The activity of the informational sector of the eurasist society must be based on the strict observance of civilisation priorities in making light upon domestic and foreign events. The principles of formation and intellectual and moral education should be set above the principles of entertainment or commercial benefit. The principle of freedom of speech must be combined with the imperative of liability for the freely spoken words.

Eurasism supposes the creation of a society of a mobilisation kind, where the principles of creation and social optimism should be the standard of human life. The world-view should uncover the potential possibilities of the man, enabling everyone – overcoming (internal and external) inertia and limitation – to express his unique personality in the service of society. At the basis of the eurasist approach to the social question lays the principle of a balance between state and private. This balance is defined by the following logic: all scale, related to strategic sphere (military-industrial complex, education, safety, peace, moral and physical health of a nation, demography, economic growth etc.) is controlled by the State. Small and medium production, the sphere of services, personal privacy, the entertainment industry, the sphere of leisure etc. are controlled not by the State but on the contrary by personal and private initiative (except for those cases when the latter conflicts with the strategic imperatives of eurasism in the global sphere).

4. Eurasism and the economy

As against liberalism and Marxism, eurasism considers the economic sphere to be neither autonomous nor determining for socio-political and state processes. According to the eurasists’ belief, economic activities are only a function of various cultural, social, political, psychological and historical realities. We might express the eurasist relation to the economy, rephrasing the Gospel truth: ” not the man for the economy, but the economy for the man “. Such relation to the economy can be called as qualitative: the thrust is done(made) not on formal digital indexes of economic growth, a significantly wider spectrum of indexes is allowed, in which  the economic force is clean is considered in a complex with others, predominantly having social character. Some economists (in particular Joseph Schumpeter) already tried to introduce qualitative parameters into economics, separating the criteria of economic growth from those of economic development. Eurasism sets the issue from an even wider perspective: what matters is not only economic development, but economic development combined with social development.

The eurasist approach to the economy can be expressed as a simplified scheme in this way: state regulation of the strategic branches (military-industrial complex, natural monopolies and similar) and maximal economic freedom for medium and small business.

The major element of the eurasist approach to the economy is the idea of the decision of a significant number of Russian national-economic problems within the framework of the eurasist foreign policy project. Is present in view of what. Some geopolitical subjects vitally interested in the multipolarity of the world – first of all, the European Union and Japan – have a huge financial-technological potential, whose engaging can sharply change the Russian economic climate. At the present stage  it is regretfully necessary to acknowledge that there are no sufficient resources in Russia for (even relative) autarchy. Therefore investments and other kinds of interaction with the advanced economic regions is vitally necessary to us. This interaction should be initially plotted on the logician by more volumetric, rather than is narrow economic relations – investment, credits, import-export, energy deliveries etc. All this should be set in the wider context of common strategic programs – such as the joint assimilation of fields or the creation of unified Eurasian transport and information systems.

In some sense Russia must lay the burden of the revival of its economic potential to the partners of the “club of supporters of multipolarity”, actively using to this purpose the possibility to offer extremely convenient joint transport projects (the “Trans-Eurasian main”) or vital energy resources for Europe and Japan .

A relevant problem is also the return of capital to Russia. Eurasism creates very serious reasons to this purpose. The confused Russia of the period of liberal reforms (beginning in the 1990s), completely turned to the West, referring to herself with distaste, immersed in the psychosis of privatisation and corruption, and the eurasist, patriotic, state-oriented Russia of the beginning of the XXI century are diametrically opposite political realities. Capital fled a weak and collapsing Russia. In a Russia set on a path of strength and recovery, capital must return.

In the Western countries most of the capitals taken out from Russia can neither be saved nor increased. In the beginning of the 1990s, the West looked with approval at Russian capital flight (mainly of criminal origin), considering  – according to the “cold war” logic – that the weakening of post-communist Russia would play in the hands of NATO countries. Now the situation has sharply  changed, and in the present conditions serious problems will arise (they already have, indeed) for the owners of illegal capitals in the West

The eurasist logic means the creation of the most favourable conditions to the return of these capitals to Russia, which in itself will provide a serious impulse to the development of the economy. Contrary to some purely liberal abstract dogmas, capital moves back faster to a state with strong, accountable authority and precise strategic orienting points, rather than to an uncontrollable, chaotic and unstable country.

5. Eurasian path

Eurasism is the pattern most precisely responding to the strategic interests of modern Russia. It gives the answers to the most difficult questions, offers an exit to the most entangled situations. Eurasism combines openness and attitude to dialog with fidelity to historical roots and consequent assertion of national interests. Eurasism offers a consistent balance between the Russian national idea and the rights of the many peoples inhabiting Russia and more widely Eurasia.

Some definite aspects of eurasism are already being used by the new Russian authorities oriented to a creative solution of the difficult historical problems Russia has to face the in new century. And every time this happens, efficiency, effectiveness, serious strategic results speak for themselves. The integration processes in the CIS, the creation of the Eurasian Economic Commonwealth, the first steps of the new foreign policy of the Russian Federation concerning Europe, Japan, Iran and the countries of the Near East, the creation of a system of Federal districts, the strengthening of the vertical line of power, the weakening of the oligarchic clans, the policy of patriotism and statehood, the increase of responsibility in the work of the mass media – all these are relevant and essential elements of eurasism. For the time being these elements are intermingled by the inertial trends of the other two patterns (liberal-democrat and soviet). And yet it is perfectly clear that eurasism is steadily moving to its zenith, whereas two other patterns conduct only “rear-guard fight”.

Enhancing the role of eurasism in Russian politics is an evolutionary and gradual process. But the time has already come for a more attentive and accountable learning of this really universal theory and philosophy, whose transformation into political and world-view practice is under our eyes.
Aleksandr Dugin, ph.d.

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